to suspect that, in changing our minds, we infl uence our abilities to accurately recall those initial reactions. Memory for reactions might therefore be susceptible to interference and reconstructive effects like those that op erate in memory fo r factual information.
A variety ·of experiments have demon strated that memory for selected aspects of fa ctual information can be influenced or biased by thematically related information encountered later (Dooling & Christiaansen, 1977; Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1978 ; Schus tack & Anderson, 1979; Snyder & Uranow itz, 1978; Spiro, 1980) . The results of many of these experiments have also suggested that the influence increases with the length of the delay before remembering; an excellent ex ample of this increase in influence overtime is pr:ovided in Spiro's study of passage memory.
After reading a passage about two college students who fe ll in love, subjects in Spiro's experiment were incidentally provided with outcome information about the couple's rela tionship. Outcome information was either consistent with the end of the passage (e.g., the outcome of marriage was consistent with a passage ending that stressed agreement about not having children), or the outcome was contradictory (the outcome of a split in the relationship was contradictory to the pas sage ending on an agreeable note). Some sub-jects had been deceived regarding a later test of passage memory, whereas others believed they were participating in a typical memory experiment. Only the former set of instruc tions led to errors in passage recall of the type that indicated the influence of the contradic tory outcome information, and these. errors occurred following either a 3-or 6-week de lay, but not after a 2-day delay.
An interesting aspect of Spiro's findings for the present research on memory for reactions concerns instructions to deceived subjects. For these subjects the passage was described as a true story; they were directed to think about the story because they would be asked, ostensibly, to react to it in the second session.' Spiro believed that these instructions en couraged the subjects to employ previous cognitive structures and that only under those conditions should evidence for an ef fect of the outcome be found. What appears equally interesting is that although subjects were never asked to indicate their reactions, their later recall may have reflected those re actions as well as any new reactions resulting from the outcome information. Further more, distinguishing between reactions to a passage and facts from the passage may have important implications for understanding the influence of subsequent information on memory.
1
In the context of passage information, re actions are defi ned as overt or covert verbal responses that �e affectively based and spe cific to a particular event or type of event described by the passage. First, reactions may contain affective components or express emotions, as do beliefs, judgments, and impressions (Zajonc, 1980) . Similarly, reac tions may express inferences about the emo tions of others, which in turn must be based on stored information of an affective nature.
Second, the word reaction implies specifi city of the response; the respoQse does not occur "out of the blue" but in reaction to some external event. In this sense, the affective components of reactions may be directly evoked by the event. As a response, a reaction must be generated, constructed or made by the individual. In contrast, facts are not made but exist independently of individual in volvement. Facts are objectively verifi able descriptions of events within the passage.
Thus, reactions and facts both may be stored in memory, the first as a representation of how the individual felt or thought (the rep resentation of a construction), the second as the representation of an external state of af fairs. (The representation of a fact may be "constructed" or elaborated, but not the fact itself.) Subsequent information may affect memory for the reaction by evoking some what different reactions. Subsequent infor mation may affect memory for facts by stat ing or inferring competing facts. These sub sequent reactions or facts may then serve as sources of interference in attempts to remem ber the original reactions or facts.
In the following experiments, memory for reactions to a biographical passage was in vestigated by varying the type of outcome information designed to alter reactions. Ex periment 1 examined the temporal condi tions for influencing memory for reactions. As is the case in memory for facts, longer retention intervals were expected to be as� sociated with larger effects of subsequent in formation ( cf. Spiro, 1980) . In. addition, the timing of outcome information within the interval was also expected to affect accuracy. Presented immediately prior to the test, ep isodic memory for the outcome might dif ferentiate reactions to the outcome from pre vious reactions. Therefore, outcome infor mation was_ predicted to affect reaction memory to a greater extent when a delay sep arated the outcome bias and the test. In Ex periment 2, bias effects in memory for re actions were compared with those in mem ory for facts from the passage. Finally, in Experiments 3 and 4 these comparisons were further explored.
Experiment 1
A general procedure was developed for measuring reactions and changes in reactions to information presented in a biographical passage. The procedure altered Spiro's meth ods to include an assessment of reactions (reaction task) following the passage and prior to the presentation of outcome infor mation; the recall task was replaced by a task to assess memory for previous reactions.
Described more completely below, the re action task required subjects to indicate the extent of their agreement with several state ments about the characters in the passage. As judged by independent raters, none of the statements referred only to the biographical passage information. Instead, they expressed inferences about the preferences and feeling of the major character. Two forms of the list of statements were available and differed only in the specifi c wording of the state ments. One form served as an indicator of initial reactions; the alternate form was used to test memory for initial reactions. (Forms and purposes were counterbalanced.) In the memory task, subjects were instructed to in dicate memory for their initial reactions, rather than reacting anew. Statements in the reaction task were designed to be sensitive to changes in reactions resulting from one of two types of biasing outcomes, presented af ter the original reaction task. The retention · interval and locus of the putcome delivery within the interval were each varied in order to assess previously discussed notions of the time required to accommodate reactions to the outcome.
Method
Ma terials. The biographical passage used in all con ditions of the experiment (see Appendix) described cer tain aspects of the life of a hypothetical person, Donna Madison, including her schooling, marriage, husband, children, and hobbies. The passage was constructed to be relatively neutral with respect to each of two out comes, which in turn corresponded to either a traditional or a nontraditional role for women.
For the reaction task, two lists of 14 statements were constructed. The Appendix provides examples. A scale was provided at the top of each form, indicating judg ments of certainly true (I) to certainly false (6). For each form, half of the statements were designed to receive low ratings from a traditional point of view ("She values her role as wife and mother above all " ), whereas the other half would deserve low ratings from a nontraditional view ("Donna probably feels that her husband has suc ceeded at her expense"). The direction of the rating was reversed for each statement on the alternate form. Ap.. proximately equal numbers of positive and negative statements were distributed within each half of each form. In general, Form I was constructed to avoid ex traneous preferenCes of any kind, and Form 2 contained reversals (affirmation or negation) of statements on Form I. Statement order was randomized.
Uniform scores for the reaction task were obtained by inverting the ratings for nontraditional statements on each form (I became 6, 2 became 5, ... , 6 became 1).
The inverted ratings were then summed with the non inverted ratings; high scores reflected a nontraditional reaction and low scores a traditional reaction. (I or 2) . Subjects were required to return for the second session 3 weeks after the first session regardless of test condition, in order to obtain credit in their courses. Those who failed to return were evenly distributed across conditions and were re placed by additional subjects. Approximately equal numbers of each sex participated within conditions.
Procedure. The order and conditions for the proce dures in Experiments I and 2 are shown in Table I . At the beginning of the initial session, subjects were told that they were participating in two short studies, the second of which had been delayed for 3 weeks because of a failure to receive all the materials. The first session was described as part of a study about reactions to real world events as they normally occur outside an exper imental setting; for this reason a true story about real people would be used. Subjects were allowed 5 minutes to read and think about the prose passage, and another 10 minutes to complete the reaction forms. This con stituted the acquisition phase for all conditions. Following the collection of reaction forms, the ex perimenter initiated a pseudo-debriefi ng session by men tioning that the story had been written about 4 years ago by a graduate student in sociology who was a friend of both the experimenter and the woman in the story. The name of the woman had, of course, been changed. The student had simply wanted to get an idea of how university students would react to various kinds of social information. Recently, she had contacted the experi menter, requesting the collection of more data, because she wanted to find out if various kinds of social changes had occurred on this campus. At this point, subjects in the delayt;d-bias condition (DD) were dismissed, whereas those in the immediate-bias conditions (II and ID) re ceived biasing information. Subjects selected to hear the traditional bias were told, "In case you'd like to know what happened to the woman in the story, my friend mentioned that she recently had another baby and was really enjoying it. The other kids were ge{ting so big and she had missed having a baby in the house. " Subjects slated for the nontraditional bias heard, "In case you'd like to know what has happened to the woman in the story, my friend mentioned that shortly after the story had been written, the woman went back and finished her B.A. She is now a graduate student in physiological psychology in California and she is looking for a research position."
Following delivery of the bias, subjects in the ID con dition were dismissed, whereas those in the II condition were tested, with the alternate reaction form, before the session was terminated. Instructions for this condition were as follows:
There is one more task to do today. I have another form, similar to the one you just filled out. I want to make sure that the two forms do not differ. Please try to remember your initial reactions while completing the first form, and base your responses to this form on that memory only. Do not rely on your memory for the numbers you chose because this form is worded differently and will not be scored the same. Save your questions until the end, so that you do not infl uence the way others respond.
were identical to the immediate-test instructions follow ing a more appropriate introduction:
During the second session, subjects in the II condition were debriefed, those in the ID condition were tested and debriefed, and those in the .tiD condition received the bias, were tested, and debriefed. In the DD condition, delivery of the bias occurred following the second sen tence of the delayed-test instructions. The bias was mod ified to indicate that the experimenter had just spoken with the sociology graduate student. These instructions
The materials for the second study never have arrived, but I have come up with a second �k for you to do. Do you remember the story you read last time? (Bias for DD condition: Oh, by the way .. .. ) Now, I want you to take a minute to remember your reactions to that story. I have another form, similar to the one you filled out last time. I want to make , sure that the two forms do not differ. Please try to remember your ini tial reactions while completing the first form. 
Results and Discussion
A three-way analysis of variance indicated no reliable differences among conditions in initial reactions to the story. In order to eval uate memory effects, difference scores were computed by subtracting the initial reaction score from the test score. Since high reaction scores indicated a nontraditional view, pos itive difference scores reflected change in the direction of the nontraditional bias. Simi larly, negative difference scores reflected change in the direction of the traditional view. 1
A three-way analysis of variance in differ ence scores· did not reveal a significant main effect of test form. Nor did interactions of test form with the other factors reach signif icance. Therefore, the data were collapsed across the test-form factor. For the following analyses, values of p < .05 were considered reliable, and MSe = 21.79.
The r((sults clearly demonstrated an effect of outcome information on memory for pre vious reactions. Table 2 presents the mean difference scores for each bias type and bias test condition. The effect of the bias was much greater for the ID condition than for the other two bias-test conditions. This result is supported by the reliable interaction of bia� type with the planned comparison ofiD con dition versus II and DD conditions, F( 1, 96) = 6. 4-3. The overall interaction of bias type with bias-test condition was also reli able, F(2, 96) = 3.22, as was the main effect of bias type, F(l, 96) = 19.26. In or(ler to determine the conditions for which the bias effect occurred, analyses of simple main ef fects were performed. The bias reliably af fected difference scores for the ID condition only, F(l, 96) = 21.21; after 3 weeks the na ture of the outcome information was re flected in the subjects' attempts to remember how they had reacted initially. The direction of difference scores in the DD condition was not predicted and perhaps indicated a general forgetting factor. However, many subjects accurately reproduced their original reaction scores.
Experiment 2
·Memory for reactions appears to be vul nerable to interference from related infor- mation in ways that may correspond to the effect of intervening materials on memory for facts. Certainly the results of Experiment 1 were consistent with the effects obtained in Spiro's study of passage memory, even though the latter did not include a condition in which outcome information was delivered. immediately prior to the delayed recall tests � Delayed-bias conditions, however, were in cluded in two separate investigations of fac tual memory, one a series of experiments by Lqftus et al. ( 1978) and the other the research of Dooling and Christiaansen ( 1977) . Loftus et al. presented slides of an auto pedestrian acc id ent, followed by a verbal bias either immediately or after various delays associated with the timing of the retention test. The subsequent bias, contained in a questionnaire about the accident, was de signed to be misleading or consistent w i th respect to the original event. If a stop sign was present in the slides, for example, mis leading information implied the existence of 1 Note that in the absence of bias effects, difference scores of a �ontrivial magnitude should indicate some form of general forgetting. As such, they might be ex pected to regress toward the mean value of reaction scores and produce a mean difference score around zero. However, the predicted results should not be con founded by a possible effect of regression toward the mean because initial reactions did not reliably differ across conditions. If subjects hearing a nontraditional bias happened to have produced a more traditional ini tial reaction mean, for example, a change in the direction of the nontraditional bias would also be considered a change in the , direction of the overall initial reaction mean. Mean reaction scores on the memory task were predicted to change in the opposite direction from the mean. a yield sign. Errors involving false recogni tion of the yield sign increased with the length of the retention interval, but the larg est effect always occurred when the mislead ing information was presented ill1mediately prior to testing.
A different approach to examining bias effects was taken by Dooling and Christiaan sen ( 1977) . Like Loftus et al., they temporally varied the presentation of the bias within the retention interval. However, unlike the re sults of Loftus et al., their results indicated a larger bias effect when the bias was deliv ered 1 week prior to testing. Noting this dif ference, Dooling and Christiaansen suggested that their bias (providing a famous-person name for the previous fi ctitious passage) may have required "an active cognitive reorga nization" of information in memory for the passage. Such a reconstruction is cleaJly not required by the introduction of the yield sign in the experiments of Loftus et al. Further more, presenting a famous-person name (Adolf Hitler or Helen Keller) may have en listed structures for storing affective reactions and impressions, untapped by misleading in ferences concerning traffic signs. The name bias possibly pertained to complex memory structures; the sign bias affected representa tions for specific aspects of an event. These differences suggest that the mechanisms of influencing memory for reactions might dif fer from those affecting memory for · facts. Yet the modalities for presenting the to-be remembered events and the biases also dif fered across the studies.
In Experiment 2, misleading information designed to influence memory for facts, or outcome information designed to affect memory for reactions, was orally presented following the same prose passage. All subjects were tested for reaction memory and fact re cognition.· If different patterns of results were obtained for the two memory measures, the alternative explanation of modality differ ences would be eliminated, and differing mechanisms for change still suspected.
Method
Materials. The prose passage and biasing informa tion from Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2.
However, forms for the reaction tasks were shortened to eight statements, preserVing the controls for possible extraneous preferences described in Experiment 1. State ments were omitted if they were reported as ambiguous in informal discussions with subjects or if the negation was structurally awkward. Additional items were elim inated to preserve the traditional/nontraditional bal ance. Two random orderings of the resulting two forms were used.
As a context for providing the bias regarding memory for passage facts, three additional reaction statements were composed. The first statement (Statement 1 below) did not introduce misleading information or repeat orig inal information; it served as a buffer to avert any sus picion of a bias manipulation. The remaining two state ments varied according to condition of fact bias. State ment 2a was consistent with the passage, which reported Donna's interest in contemporary furniture, whereas statement 2b provided misleading information about antiques. Similarly, Statement 3a repeated that Donna had three children (consistent), whereas Statement 3b implied that she had only two (misleading). Misleading statements did not directly oppose original information, as did the yield sign in Loftus et al.'s experiments. How ever, they suggested events in ways that were not entirely compatible with the corresponding details of the passage; for example, we would not consider whether Donna would like to have more than two children, unless we inferred that she had two or fewer. And, at least for those who might agree that she liked to visit antique stores, Statement 2b might presuppose an interest in antiques.
I. Donna enjoys spending her time fixing up their house. 2a. Visiting furniture stores is one of her favorite pas times. 2b. Visiting antique stores is one of her favorite pastimes. 3a. She would like to have more than three children. 3b. She would like to have more than two children.
The recognition test for passage facts consisted of eight two-alternative forced-choice items. Within each item, the target, a semantically accurate statement of passage information, was paired with an inaccurate distractor; for example, "She was a history major in college" served as a distractor for the statement that her major was En glish. Neutral items, irrelevant to the reaction state ments, occupied the fi rst five positions and the eighth position on the list. They are listed in the Appendix. For Items 6 and 7, distractors referred to the misleading re action statements described above. These distractors, with target information in parentheses, were the following:
6. Donna and Charles have two (three) children. 7. She has taken decorating courses and knows a lot about antique (contemporary) furniture.
Targets and distractors were presented in an order ran domly determined for each pair. A second list of the eight pairs differed from the original in that the within pair order was reversed.
The fi n� "debriefi ng" form used in Experiment 2 contained an explanation of the manipulation concern ing memory for facts, following a technique employed by Loftus et al. ( 1978) , and instructions to identify which information was presented in the passage and which was presented in an additional reaction statement. The de briefing form contained the following information re garding Donna's interest in furniture. (The bias con cerning number of children was similarly revealed.)
The study in which you have just been involved was designed to determine the effects of subsequent in formation on memory. In the beginning you read a story which stated that Donna knew a lot about either antique or contemporary furniture. Later you were asked to react to a statement about shopping at either antique or at furniture stores. Please indicate which information you were given at each point I read about antique furniture contemporary furniture .
I reacted to a statement about antique stores furniture stores Subjects and design. Sixteen female volunteers from general psychology classes participated in each of the nine cells of the design. Factors were bias-test condition (II, ID, or DO) and bias type (traditional, nontraditional, or misleading). Subjects hearing either of the reaction biases (traditional or nontraditional) received only con sistent information in the additional reaction statements, and thus they served as controls for assessing the bias effects for facts. Subjects who heard the misleading bias for facts received no bias regarding outcome information and served as controls for the reaction bias. Forms for the reaction and recognition tasks were counterbalanced within each cell of the design. Course credit was again made contingent upon second-session attendance; all but two subjects returned and those were replaced.
Procedure. For subjects receiving the traditional or nontraditional reaction bias, all procedures in Experi ment 1 were repeated in Experiment 2, augmented by the following. (Refer to Table 1 for a summary.) First, either immediately after the initial reaction task (II and ID conditions) or at the start of the second session (DD condition), the experimenter mentioned that three state ments had been mistakenly omitted before duplicating the reaction forms and would now be read. Subjects were instructed to listen to each statement but to write only the number chosen to indicate the extent of agreement or disagreement with each statement. The three consis tent statements (1, 2a, and 3a above) were then read. Responses were written at the bottom of the reaction forms by II and 'ID subjects and on a blank sheet of paper by DO subjects. Those in the DD condition were asked to take a minute to recall their general reactions before the statements were read, and they were provided with a judgment scale written on the chalkboard. After responses to the additional statements were collected, one of the two reaction biases was delivered.
The remaining addition to the procedures of Exper iment 1 consisted of the recognition memory test, which followed the second reaction task in all groups, and was in turn followed by the debriefing task. The instruction for the recognition task was to choose the sentence from each pair which more accurately reflected information they read in the passage. The debriefing form was dis tributed without comment. Treatment of subjects in the three bias-test conditions · who received the misleading bias for passage detail dif fered from the above only in the following ways. First, the additional statements consisted of the buffer state ment followed by the two misleading statements (1, 2b, and 3b above). Second, no outcome information was provided to bias their memory for reactions.
Results
Memory for reactions. Table 3 provides the mean difference between the reaction memory score and the original reaction score fo r each cell in the design. Although the bias effect in this experiment was weaker than the corresponding effect in Experiment 1, as demonstrated by the lack of a reliable inter action of bias type with bias-test condition, the same pattern holds: The simple main effect of the bias was reliable only fo r subjects who heard the bias 3 weeks prior to the de layed memory test, F( 2, 135) = 4.507, MSe = 18.496. As in Experiment 1, initial. reaction scores did not reliably differ among condi tions. Nor did misleading information re garding fa cts lead to reliable changes in mem ory fo r reactions across the bias-test condi tions.
Recognition of fa cts. Table 4 presents mean percentage correct recognition fo r Neutral Items 1-� and 8 and Biased Items 6,and 7. All subjects who heard outcome in- fo rmation to bias reactions were given con sistent information regarding fa cts. Since rec ognition differences between traditional and nontraditional outcome groups were not re liable and did not reliably interact with the other fa ctors, the data fr om these groups were combined into a consistent-bias category. An analysis of variance, with between-sub jects fa ctors of bias type (consistent or mis leading) and bias-test conditions (II, ID, or DD) and the within-subjects fa ctor of item type (neutral or biased), revealed a reliable three-way interaction, F(2, 125) = 4.151, . MSe = .112. This interaction can be under- Table 5 stood to partially re'flect a reliable interaction of bias type with a linear trend in bias-test condition fo r biased items only, F(1, 135) = 9.123, MSe = .088. It is clear that the effect of misleading information depended on both the delay of the bias and the d�lay ofthe test. In contrast,. correct recognition of neutral items was uninfluenced by misleading infor mation and reliably differed according to bias-test condition only, F(2, 135) = 22.829, MSe = .022; percentage correct recognition fe ll as the retention interval increased.
Judgments, on the debriefing fo rm . Table  5 presents the pattern of judgments on the debriefing fo rm, broken down according to whether the subject had correctly or incor rectly recognized the item on the recognition test. The fifth row indicates, fo r example, that out of th� 32 subjects in the delayed consis tent-bias condition, 24 correctly recognized Item 6, and 91.7% of those 24 were correct again on the debriefing fo rm; 88.2% of the 17 correct on Item 7 were also correct on the debriefing fo rm. Continuing along the fifth row, all 8 of those who were incorrect on Item 6 and 67.7 of the 15 who were incorrect on Item 7 corrected themselves on the de briefing fo rm; after reading about the nature of the experimental manipulation, these sub jects indicated that they had "really" read that Donna had three children or that she was interested in contemporary fu rniture. In a sense, the debriefing fo rm may have served as a reminder fo r these subjects. However, when subjects who heard the misleading bias after the delay (the last row of provided with the same reminder and expla nation, only 1 . 5.4% of the errors on Item 6 and 23.1% of errors on Item 7 were corrected (changed on debriefing form). In general, the last two columns of Table 5 show that most recognition errors by subjects hearing the consistent bias were corrected after debrief ing but that only 7 of a total of 51 errors in misleading-bias conditions were corrected.
Discussion
Results concerning memory for reactions essentially provide a replication of Experi ment l; the bias effect occurred only for the ID condition. Differences between bias types appeared smaller than in Experiment l; this perhaps refl ects the decrease in the number of items on the reaction sheet or gender dif ferences. (Subject availability dictated that only women participated in Experiment 2.) However, the more important point is that �he pattern of results remained the same.
In contrast, a very different pattern of re sults emerged from the recognition test. Mis leading 'information infl uenced memory for passage facts after the 3-week delay and to a greater extent when it was provided im mediately before th e delayed recognition test. These results, obtained from a verbal bias for verbal material, are very similar to the results of Loftus et al. (1978) . Both sets of results concern memory for factual details, influ enced by implications of inconsistent infor mation. We all know, for example, that stop signs and yield signs do not share the same corners at intersections. Nor do people have two children and three children (unless they have five children). And, to some extent, peo ple preferring contemporary furniture do not sear c h for antiques. When compared with the effects on memory for reactions,· these sub stitutional bias effects appear much more straightforward or direct. Moreover, rather than amounting to response bias effects, the recognition changes appear to occur on a memorial level, as demonstrated by debrief ing data in Experiment 2 and in the research of Loftus et al.
In the debriefing task of Experiment 2, very few of the recognition errors made by subjects hearing the misleading statements were corrected after the nature of the rnanipulation was explained.
· These subjects were probably no more willfully tenacious in their errors than others (who most often chose the correct information on the second try). Instead their confirmed errors may sug gest that correct information was no longer accessible. It is also important to notice that this tendency not to correct the error was at least as strong in t h e immediate-bias, de layed-test condition, in which only 2 of 20 errors were corrected after debriefing com pared with 5 of 26 errors in the delayed-bias, delayed-test condition. The effect · of the im mediate bias similarly cannot be attributed to confusion. Finally, obtaining a larger bias effect in the ·delayed-bias condition cannot be attributed· solely to a general decline in passage mem ory. If such a decline invited use of tlte recent bias, it would do so differentially for Items 6 and 7. Item 6 has higher overall recognition than Item 7 (see Table 5 ), yet the effect of misleading information is the same. In ad dition, a general decline should encourage use of the delayed consistent bias to boost recognition accuracy in the DO condition. Yet accuracy did not improve over the ID condition. Although the latter result is puz zling, it denies that the bias effect in the DO condition resulted only from poor passage memory.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, several aspects of the methodology for investigating memory for reactions differed from the corresponding aspects in studying memory for facts. Before much can be said regarding the possibility of different mechanisms in remembering reac tions and facts, some of the extraneous as pects of the tasks must be examined. Without pretending to equate the two sets of proce dures, Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to make the procedures somewhat more comparable.
In Experiment 2, instructions to reme m ber original reactions may have alerted sub jects to disregard subsequent reactions to a greater extent than instructions to remember the story suggested disregarding subsequent "facts." This possible difference in emphasis might contribute to an alternative explana-tion for the different patterns of results within delayed-bias, delayed-test conditions when bias and memory instructions were presented contiguously. Differing degrees of episodic distinctiveness of the bias, established through test instructions, could account fo r the ab sence versus the presence of bias effects in the DD conditions. Accordingly, one pur pose in conducting Experiment 3 was to vary the emphasis of disregarding subsequent in fo rmation in remembering passage fa cts. If subjects who are explicitly directed to ignore possibly fa ulty references to passage fa cts still make recognition errors based on misleading statements, then episodic distinctiveness be comes less important as a rival explanation fo r reaction and fa ct 'differences.
The second line of reasoning leading to Experiment 3 involved the respective natures of the memory, tests. Specifi cally, the test of memory fo r reactions appeared to require greater retrieval efforts than did the two-al ternative recognition test for fa cts. Not only were there six alternative ratings, but the choice with respect to any particular item had to be based partially on memory fo r a more general reaction because the original item was worded differently. In short, re membering reactions may have been made more complex a task than remembering fa cts. And since the reaction memory test cannot be converted to a two-alternative, fo rced-choice recognition task without losing all sensitivity, a cued-recall test of memory fo r fa cts was included as part of the proce dures of Experiment 3. The cued-recall task is clearly more similar to the reaction mem ory task in the amount of information that must be retrieved than is the recognition task.
Method
A total of 128 volunteers from general psychology classes participated in the three-factor design, 16 in each combination of bias timing (immediate or delayed), bias type (consistent or misleading), and instructions (pre vious memory instructions or explicit instructions to ignore all intervening references to story facts). An ad ditional group of 16 subjects served as a no-bias control, to assess the possible facilitative effect of repeating details in the consistent-bias conditions.
The material and procedures of Experiment 2 were employed and modified in the following ways. Imme diate-test conditions were omitted, and all conditions were tested after the 3-week delay. No outcome infor mation was provided to bias memory for reactions, although the reaction task was used in the first session as a rationale for the experiment and the reaction memory task was used in the second session to assess memory without the intervening reaction bias. The additional reaction items again provided the context for presenting the consistent or misleading bias for facts; they were read at the end of the first session (immediate bias) or at the beginning of the second· session (delayed bias). Then, following the reaction memory test, a cued-recall test of memory for facts preceded the recognition test.
The cued-recall task was introduced with instructions that either duplicated the recognition instructions in Experiment 2 or stressed the importance of ignoring in tervening material, as did memory-for-reaction instruc tions in Experiment 2. In the first case, subjects were asked to remember details from the story and to provide an answer to each question, guessing if all else failed. In the second case, more explicit instructions stated that subjects should base their answers to the questions on their memories of the passage only and should not be influenced by any references to passage information oc curring in the meantime. The recall test consisted of eight questions, corresponding to the.content and order of items on the recognition test. Finally, the recognition test was preceded by repeated instructions appropriate to each condition but was mod ified to describe the forced-choice procedure. It was fol lowed by the debriefing form. In summary, subjects in the immediate-bias condition read and reacted to the passage, heard the consistent or misleading extra statements, waited 3 weeks, then re turned for a reaction memory test, a recall test, recog nition, and debriefing. Subjects in the delayed-bias con dition did everything in the above order with one ex ception. They waited 3 weeks befo re hearing the extra statements, instead of after. In both conditions of bias timing, instructions for the recall and recognition test varied between subjects (see Table 6 ).
·

Results and Discussion
Recognition. Table 7 presents averaged correct recognition ofltems 6 and 7, in each combination of bias timing, bias type, and instructions. A three-way analysis of variance revealed a reliable interaction of timing with type, F( l, 120) = 3.800, MSe = .403,2 which indicates that the misleading bias had a larger effect when it was presented just prior to the delayed test. This outcome replicated the rec ognition results in Experiment 2. However, the instructions fa ctor did not reliably inter act with either timing or type, or produce a reliable effect alone. In fa ct, the pattern of means presented in the lower half of Table  7 (instructions to ignore) closely resembles that above (previous instruc�ions). Although fai lure to rej ect the hypothesis of no differ ences is just that, it must be noted that the episodic distinctiveness of the bias remains unsupported as an alternative explanation of the reaction-versus-facts differences. This is the case because instructions more similar to those used in the reaction memory task yielded results typical of the memory-for fa cts effect.
Unreported in Table 7 , the mean per centage correct recognition in the no-bias control group was 56.3; a comparison with performance in conditions receiving a con sistent bias indicates no fa cilitative effect of repetition in the consistent conditions. The lack of a recognition advantage in the de layed consistent-bias condition may indicate that "contemporary fu rniture" is a difficult detail to remember and one that gets no boost fr om the consistent statement: Visiting fu rniture stores is one of her fa vorite pas times. Note. Each mean is based on the data from 16 subjects, and percentages are based on two responses per subject.
Recall. Table 8 presents the mean per centage of correct answers to Questions 6 and 7. Again, a three-way analysis of variance showed a reliable interaction of timing with type, F(l, 120) = 9.899, MSe = .285 (see Footnote 2) . In addition, when the data were scored fo r number of errors refl ecting the misleading bias, this interaction was again obtained, F( 1, 120) = 8.634, MSe = .497; the greater number of recall errors was produced by those subjects who heard misleading in fo rmation, especially if it was delivered just before the test. These effects on the number of correct responses and the number of biased errors did not depend on the instruc tions fa ctor, which did not reliably interact with either timing or type alone. Nor did the instructions fa ctor produce a reliable main effect. In short, the pattern of recall errors was similar to the pattern of recognition re sults and thereby does not encourage serious consideration of complexity of the memory task as an alternative explanation of the re action-versus-facts effects. Debriefing and memory fo r reactions. Debriefi ng data were again examined to de termine the number of correct responses on the debriefing fo rm as a function of the cor redness of recognition. These results were similar to those obtained in Experiment 2. Moreover, they did not reliably vary accord ing to the condition of instructions. Of the subjects who heard misleading information and allowed it to affect recognition perfo r mance (incorrect recognition), none in the immediate-bias condition rectified the error on the debriefi ng fo rm. Three of the 52 errors in the delayed misleading condition were cor rected, two of them under explicit instruc tions to ignore the bias.
Finally, three-way analyses of variance were performed on the original reaction scores and on the difference scores. No reli able effects were obtained with either mea sure. The grand mean of the difference scores was .932, a result indicating that some amount of change in the direction of the tra ditional bias is perhaps built into the design of the reaction task methodology.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 3, instructions to remem ber fa cts were varied with respect to their explicit reference to biasing information, yet differential effects on recall or recognition were not obtained. In Experiment 4, the op posite approach was taken in attempting to make instructions with regard to the bias comparable fo r reactions and fa cts. Previous (Experiment 2) instructions to remember ini tial reactions clearly oriented subjects to dis regard any reactions to outcome informa tion, and these instructions were repeated in the memory instructions condition of Ex periment 4. However, in another instructions condition, disguised bias, the biasing out come information was presented as part of instructions to remember initial reactions. This approach obviously could be used only in the delayed-bias condition, but it appeared to be the only reasonable way both to mimic the deceptive conditions fo r biasing memory fo r fa cts and to specify that the task was to remember reactions, rather than to react anew. In this condition of instructions, sub jects were not alerted that biasing informa tion was novel or clearly different fr om pas sage information. In a similar fa shion, sub jects in previous experiments had not been �erted that misleading fa ctual information w as different from corresponding passage fa cts.
Two additional aspects of Experiment 4 concerned the nature of the reaction task and the validity of the memory measure. First, additional subjects in each condition of bias timing and bias type �ere asked to indicate their current reactions to story information during the second session. These second re actions were designed to serve a comparative fu nction regarding the memory scores. In particular, it was assumed in previous ex periments that outcome information would necessarily modify reactions; if this were not true, it would be difficult to understand the regularities in the difference score data. An other problem in interpreting the difference scores would result if, in contrast, new re action scores would tum out to be much dif-fe rent fr om the initial reactions-if, for ex ample, they changed in an opposite directipn fr om that predicted fo r each bias type.
Finally, the procedure in Experiment 4 in cluded a manipulation check in the fo rm of a fi nal debriefing questionnaire. Subjects were asked to indicate the most recent in fo rmation they had received about the woman in the story; greater inaccuracy was expected from the disguised-bias condition.
Method
The nature of the disguised-bias condition of the in structions precluded crossing all three levels of instruc tions (memory, new reactions, and disguised bias) with the bias timing factor. pisguised-bias instructions were administered in the delayed�bias condition of timing only, but fo r both traditional and nontraditional types of bias. In the nontraditional condition, fo r example, disguised-bias instructions to remember initial reactions were as fo llows:
The fi rst thing we want you to do is to try to remember the story you read in the last session and your reac tions to that story. I know it's difficult, but I can't say much to cue your memory. Let me just remind you that at the end of the story the womari went back to school and is now a physiological psychologist.
In the same manner, the traditional condition was told that the woman was thrilled about having another baby.
Memory instruction, like those in Experiment 2, em phasized memory fo r initial reactions with no mention of outcome information. Instructions for the new-re actions condition of the instructions factor were uni fo rmly the fo llowing:
The fi rst thing we want you to do is to try to remember the story you read in the last session, and to once again indicate your reactions to that story. Be sure to allow your responses on the reaction fo rm to refl ect any changes which may have occurred since your pre vious reactions.
Twelve volunteers participated in each of the 10 cells of the design (two crossed factors of bias timing and bias type with two levels each, and the instructions factor with two levels crossed with the other factors and one level, disguised bias, nested within the delayed timing condition only). The procedure corresponded to that .of Experiment I in most respects. Immediate-test condi tions were omitted. Also, the test fo r fa ct recognition followed the reaction-memory test, to again assess pos sible effects of outcome information on memory fo r fa cts. The recognition test was followed by a debriefing fo rm containing these statements: 
Note. Data from 12 subjects contributed to each mean.
Please indicate the context in which you encoun
tered the information you checked in Item 1.
(a) The information was presented in the story I read.
(b) The information was presented by the experi menter.
A correct response to Debriefi ng Statement 1 (alternative a or b) should refl ect memory fo r the biasing information itself, whereas selection of one of the incorrect alterna tives should indicate that either the specifi c outcome described in the bias or the timing of its description (after the passage) is not remembered; responses to Debriefing Statement 2, especially by subjects who correctly iden tified outcome information, should clarify what they in terpreted "most recent" to mean. Correct responses to both debriefing questions might provide some indication of episodic memory fo r outcomes and were expected to occur most frequently 'under memory and new-reaction instruction, fo llowing a delayed bias. Incorrect responses were expected in the disguised-bias condition, as a check on the deception procedure. In summary, subjects in the immediate-bias condition read and reacted to the passage, heard either the tradi tional or the nontraditional outcome, waited 3 weeks, and then were tested fo r either new reactions or memory fo r initial reactions. Subjects in the delayed-bias con dition read and reacted to the story, waited 3 weeks, returned either to hear one of the outcome biases and to react anew, to remember old reactions following the explicit description of a biasing outcome, or to remem ber old reactions following a bias disguised as part of the instructions. Finally, all subjects took the recognition test and answered the debriefing questions (see Table 6 ). Table 9 reports the mean difference scores in each of the l 0 cells of the design. Because of missing cells, these results were analyzed as two separate designs, one to compare new reaction instructions with memory instruc tions in each combination of bias timing and bias type (the top fo ur rows of Table 9 ) and the dther to examine differences among all Note. The data were combined across bias-type condi tions; 24 correct responses; therefore, were possible in each combination of instruction and bias timing.
Results and Discussion
three instructional conditions within tradi tional and nontraditional delayed-bias con ditions only (the right column of Table 9 ).
Memory versus new reactions . A three fa ctor analysis of variance fa iled to indicate a reliable interaction of timing and type with the instructions factor, even though the pat tern of differences suggests such an interac tion. Following memory instructions, a re liable bias effect was obtained under imme diate-bias conditions only, F(1 , 88) = 6.007 , MSe = 17 .341, a finding that replicates pre vious results. However, under instructions to react anew, the bias effect was reliable when delivered immediately, F(1, 88) = 6.007, as well as when delivered just prior to the sec ond reactions, F(l , 88) = 3.666. These results indicate that outcome information does change reactions and that the change is in the direction previously assumed fo r each bias type. 3 Instructional effe cts for the delayed bias. A two-factor analysis of variance did not re veal a reliable interaction of bias type with instructions. However, it is apparent in the right column of Table 9 that the bias effect under disguised conditions was not reliably different from the effect under memory con ditions; neither was reliable. [Employing the new error term still produced a reliable effect for new reactions at delayed testing, F( 1, 66) = 4.7 90, MSe = 13.273.] The lack of a bias effect in disguised-bias conditions, of course, may be attributed to the weakness of the bias, yet the same must then be said about the "disguised" bias for the fa cts in Experi ments 2 and 3. Although difficult to interpret, this lack of a reaction-bias effect still differs fr om the replicated fa ct-bias effect. In making the procedures more comparable, the ar rangements of this study did not affect the divergence of outcomes.
Resp onses on the debriefing fo rm. Table  10 presents the number of subjects in each condition of bias timing and instruction who correctly identified the bias as the most re cent information (top half) and the source of the bias, given correct identificatio11 of most recent (bottom half). A Pearson chi square test of independence indicated that subjects receiving an , immediate bias and memory or new-reaction instructions were less likely to correctly identify the most re cent information than were those receiving a delayed bias (xt = 6.544, p < .025). This manipulation check supports the notion that episodic information about the bias is not readily accessible after 3 weeks. Even among the 30 subjects in immediate-bias conditions who correctly indicated the most recent in fo rmation (the bias), 7 reported that it had been presented in the story. This constitutes fa irly direct evidence fo r loss of episodic in fo rmation regarding the bias, considering that similar errors were not made by delayed bias subjects under memory or new-reaction instructions.
In contrast, delayed disguised-bias subjects were often wrong about the most recent in fo rmation, responding more similarly to im mediate-bias subjects than to those in the other delayed conditions. A chi-square test indicated that the three delayed conditions reliably differed in correctness on Statement l (xt = 11 .297, p < .01 ). In addition, 4 of the 12 correct responders who had heard the disguised bias believed it had been presented in the story, a result somewhat confirming its disguise. More generally, the large number of errors (12 of 24) in identifying most recent information so soon after its delivery suggests that the ruse was on target.
Recognition. Although no reliable effects were obtained with the overall recognition measure, correct recognition of Item 8 ("Donna is basically discontent/content with her life") was ·significantly related to scores on the initial reaction task (r = -.24, p < .01 ). Larger initial reaction scores, indicating less traditional reactions, were associated with falsely remembering that Donna was discontent.
General Discussion
Memory fo r reactions or judgments con cerning events described in a passage appar ently is susceptible to interference effects, as is memory fo r facts from the passage. How ever, interference with reaction memory was achieved when 3 weeks separated the bias and test, whereas the largest effect on fa ct memory was obtained when the bias oc curred just prior to this delayed test. When various aspects of instructions and testing fo r reaction and fa ct memory were made more comparable in Experiments 3 and 4, the di vergent pattern of effects still held.
One possible approach fo r understanding these differences is to fo cus on the nature of the memory representations and correspond ing process assumptions ( cf. Anderson, 1978) . · The initial processing task presumably results in representations of passage information and in representations of reactions to passage information. This distinction may require specifi cation on a theoretical level, and its nature may be associated with the manner in which the information is generated ( cf. Jacoby, 1978; Raye, Johnson, & Taylor, 1980; Slamecka & Graf, 1978) . Specifically, the distinction between internally and exter nally generated memory representations ap pears to be related to the present differences between memory fo r reactions and memory fo r facts. According to Raye et al., greater accuracy regarding internally generated rep resentations can be attributed to the greater likelihood that they include information about the processes that produced them. If this is the case fo r representations of reactions, information concerning additional re actions to outcome information and how they might differ fr om original reactions might be available fo r some period of time fo llowing the presentation of the outcome. In contrast, externally generated represen tations, such as those comprising passage memory, are not so likely to include infor mation about operations performed on them, such as the storage of inferences based on misleading statements. This line of reasoning leads to the speculation that we pay attention to our processing efforts when asked to think or construct a response but not when asked to read or listen.
What fo llows from the generation distinc tion is that available evidence concerning cognitive operations can be used to make judgments required by test conditions. When we are made to think, we remember how we did it. In the present experiments, such evi dence presumably is accessible immediately fo llowing reaction biases and is useful in dis tinguishing old reactions fr om new reactions. After a delay of 3 weeks, subjects no longer appear to be able to make this distinction, perhaps because memory for specific opera tions, like other kinds of episodic informa tion, is no longer accessible. Similarly, very little information concerning the changes in externally generated passage memory is ac cessible under any condition, according to the present line of reasoning. The latter no tion is supported by the debriefing data in Experiments 2 and 3. Following a description of the manipulation regarding passage mem ory, subjects were still unaware of having been affected by the bias. Yet their fa lse rec ognition of misleading information was greatest under delayed-bias conditions. This pattern of results may demonstrate a recency effect of biasing information that emerges when information regarding cognitive oper-· ations is unavailable.
Admittedly, the value of the correspon dence between the reaction-versus-facts dis tinction and the generation distinction in accounting fo r the present differences is not strongly established. The usefulness of the analogy hinges on differential accessibility of information about cognitive operations, metamemorial information. This, of course, provides a possible direction fo r fu ture re search.
A related issue fo cuses on the locus of bias generation. In the present experiments, 'the fu nctional bias in memory fo r reactions was assumed to be reactions internally generated by outcome information; externally provided details served to bias fact memory.4 Perhaps this compatibility in locus of generation is important in obtaining bias effects, particu larly in reaction memory. On the other hand, considering the large body of evidence sug gesting that internally generated inferences lead to errors in memory fo r fa cts ( cf. Brans fo rd, Barclay, & Franks, 1972) , perhaps in ternally generated "biases" will always exert large effects, provided that information abOut the source of the bias is not accessible.
Still another line of reasoning leading off fr om the present research involves the ease with which any source of relevant informa tion can be inserted within or added onto the representation of,previous information. The nature of reaction memory may logically re quire restructuring by biasing i!lformation, whereas fa cts may directly replace or strap onto other fa cts in memory, as well as re structure or . reorganize. Potentially, the re structuring operation could ·require more time to show a bias effect, and replacement operations could produce immediate results. Again, restructuring operation may produce metamemorial effects as well as bias effects. All these issues, and others, remain to be ad dressed.
A fi nal consideration in the present con ceptualization is required fo r the obvious yet important observation that reactions and fa cts often differ in memorability. In most of the cases, remembering reactions should be an easier and more successful task than remembering facts. To be more precise, to the extent that reactions and judgments re quire more cognitive effort (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1979; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979) , are associated with a high degree of internal generation (Raye et al., 1980) , or involve self reference (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) , they will be remembered bet ter than fa cts. This comparison, although difficult to make in specific real-world set tings, is quite relevant to the observation that we report our reactions along with the facts about events. It may be that we fi ll in hazy areas in our memories for facts with easily retrieved memories fo r reactions to the set of fa cts as a whole. Furthermore, this line of reasoning also suggests that a bias fo r reac tion memory strengthens that memory, in its altered fo rm, through the very process of re-, structuring or regenerating. In contrast, a bias in memory fo r fa cts typically does noth ing but impose a last-minute change.
